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Executive Summary 
 
In January 2010 the New Zealand Government introduced a continuous disclosure regime for 
State-Owned Enterprise (SOEs) modelled on the regime applying to publicly-listed 
companies (PLCs). The government sees continuous disclosure increasing the transparency of 
SOEs, and that this will lead to improved financial performance by SOEs. We analyse the 
traditional rationales for continuous disclosure in PLCs, and find that it is not axiomatic that a 
continuous disclosure regime designed for PLCs overlaid onto an SOE will offer the same 
incentives for performance improvement. The differences in owner identity and governance 
relationships in SOEs and the absence of a market for the trading of shares substantially 
weaken the performance improvement effect of the disclosure instrument in SOEs. In the 
absence of share trading, it is not clear how a failure to disclose by SOE managers could be 
detected. Furthermore, under the New Zealand arrangements, the sanctions for SOE failure to 
disclose are very weak. This suggests that it is both easier for and more likely that SOE 
managers will withhold material information relative to their PLC counterparts. The 
hypothesis appears confirmed by a matched-pair comparison of disclosures by SOEs and 
private sector firms in the first year of the SOE continuous disclosure regime. 
  
- 3 - 
 
Can continuous disclosure improve the 
performance of State-Owned Enterprises? 
 
1. Introduction 
“The State-Owned Enterprise model established under the 1986 SOE Act, arguably 
represents the best attempt to have efficient public businesses. The SOE model has a 
number of characteristics that suggest SOE business performance will not exceed that 
of privately-owned firms.” (Boles de Boer & Evans, 2000, pp.4-5).  
 
“We have been through a period of high investment [in SOEs] but have not seen a 
flow on into profits or dividends. The Crown, as owner of these assets, is not yet 
seeing a return commensurate with the value of its investments.” (COMU, 2010, p.5) 
 
“The Government is increasing its focus on the [SOE] commercial portfolio to ensure 
that it is being managed as effectively as possible. Crown-owned commercial 
activities do not face the same market scrutiny as listed companies, but we believe it 
is important to replicate market disciplines as much as possible. We are increasing 
transparency in several ways including continuous disclosure requirements for SOEs, 
annual public meetings and publication of performance information.” (COMU, 2010, 
p.2) 
 
As part of the reforms of New Zealand‟s state sector beginning in the 1980s, many 
government trading activities were separated out into stand-alone companies, known as State-
Owned Enterprises (SOEs)
 1
. The rationale was for these new entities to replicate as far as was 
possible the institutional structures and governance arrangements of privately-owned firms. 
Furthermore, the firms would be exposed to competitive market disciplines. These measures 
were proposed as means of addressing the lacklustre financial performance of the trading 
activities under monopolised government department structures. Key features of the SOE 
model which directly paralleled private sector structures were the imposition of limited 
liability status (i.e. it was not axiomatic that SOEs would be protected by Crown immunity), 
and the separation of ownership and control. Ownership of a shareholding interest was vested 
in an arms-length Minister and control was vested in a Board of Directors to undertake 
primary governance responsibility for the operation of the entities.. Financial performance 
                                                     
1 A state-owned enterprise is an entity owned by a government that is engaged in commercial activities and is expected to be run 
as a profitable business. Outside of New Zealand similar entities are known as government-owned corporations or government 
business enterprises. 
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improvement was presumed to arise from greater transparency, role clarity and the alignment 
of incentives to commercial rather than political objectives (Horn, 1995).  
 
Whilst some improvements in financial performance have accrued from the creation of the 
SOEs (Boles de Boer & Evans, 2000), the opening quotations illustrate that the gains have 
been less than anticipated. SOEs do not appear to be performing as efficiently as their private 
sector counterparts. This is of considerable concern given the extent to which SOEs dominate 
New Zealand‟s infrastructure investment – a segment which in most comparator economies is 
predominantly privately held (Capital Market Development Taskforce, 2009). As successive 
governments have pledged to retain majority, if not complete ownership of these SOEs in the 
medium term, policy-makers have been charged with finding new mechanisms via which 
SOE financial performance might be improved. Given that the creation of SOEs was inspired 
by the overlaying of structural and governance features from privately-held firms onto SOEs, 
it is unsurprising to find that remaining differences between the SOE and Publicly-Listed 
Companies (PLCs) were examined to determine whether other instruments transferred across 
might lead to SOE performance improvements.  
 
On 21 January 2010, New Zealand‟s National Government announced the introduction of a 
„continuous disclosure regime‟ for the nine largest SOEs23. The regime requires each SOE to 
disclose to the public the fundamental terms of any material transactions entered into, and any 
information that has a material impact on the SOE‟s commercial value, as soon as the SOE 
becomes aware of this information
4
. This disclosure regime mirrors similar regimes for PLCs 
on the New Zealand Exchange (NZX) and stock exchanges around the world. The 
Government‟s stated intent is to open SOEs up to greater monitoring by citizens and analysts, 
which is hoped to induce better performance by SOE managers.  
 
The overlaying of a PLC-inspired continuous disclosure regime onto SOEs leads to the 
question of whether the obligation will necessarily lead to the desired performance 
improvements. Answering the question necessitates a detailed examination of the purpose and 
effect of the instrument in the PLC context, and the extent to which the SOE context mirrors 
or deviates from the PLC one. The key factor for consideration would appear to be the 
identity and incentives facing the respective differing ownership interests. Continuous 
disclosure by PLCs provides information to shareholder-owners enabling them to better exert 
                                                     
2 http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/more-disclosure-soes Accessed 1 December 2010. 
3 NZ Rail Corporation, Transpower, Meridian, Mighty River Power, Landcorp, Genesis, NZ Post, Solid Energy and Kordia. 
4 http://www.comu.govt.nz/resources/pdfs/disclosures/soe-discl-rules-dec09.pdf Accessed 1 December 2010. 
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their ownership interests via the firm‟s governance arrangements. But are the same 
opportunities and incentives likely to apply when the ownership interests and the execution of 
formal governance instruments are concentrated in the hands of a shareholding minister rather 
than in the beneficial-owner citizens? From an assessment of the transferability of the 
continuous disclosure instrument, this paper concludes that significant differences in the SOE 
context mean that the imposition of continuous disclosure obligations on SOEs is unlikely to 
substantially reduce the financial performance gap between SOEs and private enterprises.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains the difference between continuous and 
periodic disclosure. In Section 3, we evaluate the theory of self-induced disclosure and 
explain why voluntary disclosure may be suboptimal. Section 4 outlines the three main 
rationales for a continuous disclosure regime in the private sector, and how these benefits 
change when the regime is applied to SOEs. We then discuss whether increased transparency 
can improve SOE performance in Section 5. Section 6 discusses the credibility of the regime 
and evaluates how well it has performed over the first 15 months of operation. Section 7 
concludes.  
2. Continuous vs. periodic disclosure  
Continuous disclosure regimes require companies to immediately disclose material 
information to the public via a formal channel accessible equally to all interested stakeholders 
when executives first become aware of its existence (usually via a formal channel accessible 
equally to all interested stakeholders, such as the web site of the stock exchange on which the 
firm is listed). For PLCs, material information is defined as information that, if it were 
available, would have a material impact on the price of a company‟s shares. This may include 
information like a natural disaster disrupting the operations of a business, changes in key 
strategic or operational imperatives or the agreement of a contract with an essential supplier. 
Periodic disclosure, on the other hand, requires that a company release a specific set of 
information about the company at regular intervals, for example annual and quarterly reports. 
This paper focuses on continuous disclosure, assuming that the requirement of periodic 
disclosure is already in place. That is, we will be considering the utility of continuous 
disclosure over and above periodic disclosure. 
3. The theory of self-induced disclosure 
A principal-agent relationship is where a person (the principal) engages another person (the 
agent) to perform an action on their behalf (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Generally the principal and agent have differing interests, which means an unconstrained 
agent cannot be expected to act perfectly in the interests of the principal. The most commonly 
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studied example of this relationship is between the owners of a firm and the firm‟s 
management
5
; however the agency problem can be found in all areas of cooperative 
endeavour including the coordination of entities in the same layer of a hierarchical structure, 
for example between shareholders. 
 
Agency costs are the additional costs of using an agent compared to the principals 
undertaking the task themselves. Agency costs arise because the agents and principals, in 
general, have: 
 different interests; 
 different attitudes to risk; and 
 different access to information (information asymmetries). 
 
In a company with separated ownership and control, shareholders would like the managers of 
a company to take actions that increase shareholder wealth. Managers on the other hand may 
prefer to act in their own interest, for example by putting less effort into the tasks. 
Shareholders can be expected to explicitly trade-off between monitoring and the creation of 
incentives in order to minimise the costs (including mitigating the risks) of imperfect agency 
(Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). Importantly, the design of monitoring and enforcement regimes 
and incentive mechanisms is contingent upon the principal‟s ability to obtain relevant, 
credible information in a timely manner.  
 
This paper focuses on the information asymmetries that arise between shareholders and 
managers. Shareholders benefit from greater disclosure of information because it allows them 
to better constrain the actions of their agents. However, managers may prefer not to disclose 
information that reflects badly on their managerial skills or directly affects their 
compensation. 
 
The theory of self-induced disclosure states that managers have an incentive to disclose all 
material information without government regulation (Easterbrook & Fischel, 1984). There are 
two main sources of this incentive. First, disclosing information will make shares in the 
company more attractive to investors. Thus the firm will be able to sell its shares for a higher 
price, or they will be traded at a higher price on the secondary market. If a manager‟s 
compensation is tied to the company‟s share price, the manager has an incentive to disclose 
the efficient level of information. Second, the manager has an interest in maintaining a 
                                                     
5 For our purposes, we define management to be a company‟s board of directors and its senior management team. More detailed 
models might examine the principal-agent relationship between the board and senior management. 
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reputation as a good manager (good meaning good for investors), as this will lead to greater 
employment opportunities in the future and a larger future income. This may also include 
future interactions with the manager‟s current employer, for example renegotiating 
compensation. Thus the manager will maximise her future expected income by disclosing all 
material information.  
 
The primary flaw in this argument arises because investors cannot easily distinguish between 
a firm that discloses all information and a firm that discloses most information but withholds 
some
6
. If investors cannot distinguish between the firms, managers have an opportunity to 
withhold some information from shareholders without facing the penalty from a decreased 
share price. A manager who has an incentive not to disclose material information, for example 
to hide mistakes, will thus choose to withhold information in some circumstances. Knowing 
this, investors will treat all firms on the basis that some information may have been withheld. 
Consequently, the incentives to disclose are negated. As disclosure is costly to the manager, 
the quantum of information disclosed even by „honest‟ managers will decrease. At the 
extreme, where consumers have no way at all to distinguish between credible information and 
cheap talk, the equilibrium outcome is no voluntary information disclosure at all – indeed, 
shareholders may have to explicitly compensate managers for the cost of its production to 
induce the disclosure of any information at all (Prendergast, 2003). 
 
Another weakness of voluntary disclosure regimes is that unregulated managers can change 
how much focus the media and investors put on their disclosure by changing the timing of its 
release. For example, a manager may release information on the same day as a major event 
(for example, a sporting match) or on a Friday in the hope that it will receive less attention. 
Thus a manager can time the release of bad news to ensure fewer investors see the disclosure. 
With continuous disclosure, managers are forced to disclose information as soon as it comes 
to hand, meaning they cannot delay disclosure to a more opportune time. 
 
These weaknesses in the theory of self-induced disclosure are supported by empirical 
evidence. If the theory of self-induced disclosure applied, we would expect the introduction of 
continuous disclosure rules to have no impact on the frequency of disclosure. Dunstan, 
Gallery and Truong (2008) present evidence that statutory backing of the NZX‟s continuous 
disclosure rules increased the frequency of disclosures significantly. They studied the eight-
year period 1998-2005 (inclusive) looking at management earnings forecasts in disclosures. 
From 1998-2002, the NZX continuous disclosure regime had no legislative backing, which 
                                                     
6 This is an application of Akerlof‟s (1970) seminal analysis of the „Market for Lemons‟.  
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limited the severity of punishments that could be issued for nondisclosure. With the passing 
of the Securities Markets Amendment Act 2002, punishments for nondisclosure could be 
issued by the Securities Commission up to $30,000, and by the courts up to $300,000. If the 
theory of self-induced disclosure were correct, one would expect no change in the frequency 
of disclosures after the passing of the law, since all managers were already disclosing all 
information they were required to. Instead, the three found that the frequency of disclosures 
increased significantly after 2002, consistent with our critique of the theory. 
 
Under the theory of self-induced disclosure, we would also expect managers to release 
material negative information as soon as it comes to hand.
7
 Pastena and Ronen (1979) provide 
evidence that managers try to delay the disclosure of negative information, relative to positive 
information, and that managers generally only disclose negative information when a third 
party is likely to disclose the information anyway. Once again, this evidence does not support 
the theory of self-induced disclosure. 
 
Considering the theoretical and empirical evidence presented above, we conclude that the 
theory of self-induced disclosure is unsupported. Managers will withhold some material 
information when it is personally advantageous for them to do so, at the expense of 
shareholder-principals. In principle, therefore, a continuous disclosure obligation is desirable 
so long as the benefits arising exceed the costs of compliance.  
4. Rationales for continuous disclosure in PLCs 
In this section we outline the three major rationales for a continuous disclosure regime when 
applied to publicly listed companies: informing investors, preventing insider trading and 
reducing information acquisition costs. Each is examined in turn, with a discussion of its 
applicability to the SOE context.  
 
4.1 Informing investors 
One of the risks an investor faces when trading in a company‟s shares is that he does not have 
the most up-to-date information. Periodic disclosure cannot remove this risk. A company that 
reported honestly that it was performing well in its last annual report may get into financial 
difficulty during the subsequent year. The manager may not disclose this information, fearing 
it would reflect badly on her performance, and hoping that she would be able to rescue the 
situation before the next periodic disclosure. If an investor is not aware of this information, he 
                                                     
7 When trading, an investor would prefer to have the most up to date information available. Thus, delaying the disclosure of 
information harms investors just like not disclosing information. This is discussed further in Section 4.1 below. 
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may unwittingly invest in a company at a share price much greater than its underlying value. 
Continuous disclosure removes the risk of trading on out-of-date information because if the 
underlying value of the company changes, the manager is required to disclose this information 
immediately. 
 
In the case of SOEs, the ultimate investors are taxpayers and citizens since they bear the 
financial consequences arising from residual profit or residual loss from the activities of 
SOEs. However, citizens cannot trade their ownership shares in SOEs. They can only affect 
their level of investment in SOEs by voting in a government with a policy to divest or reinvest 
in SOEs. As citizens only have this opportunity once every election cycle, there is no 
timeliness imperative for information to be released „continuously‟. Instead a detailed 
periodic disclosure would suffice. 
 
Furthermore, under the SOE arrangements, the primary beneficiary of any information 
disclosed for the purposes of informing investors is the shareholding Minister, and his 
monitoring agents the Crown Ownership Monitoring Unit (COMU). A continuous public 
disclosure regime adds nothing to COMU‟s ability to engage in its SOE‟s performance 
monitoring as the unit has access to a very much larger body of information than the standard 
public announcements by the SOEs
8
.  
 
It could be argued that the SOE continuous disclosure regime might perform a role by 
providing information that can be utilised by the media or politicians to highlight elements of 
SOE performance. However given limited extent to which voters can influence SOE 
managers, and the objectives of the structural changes in the 1980s designed to minimise the 
extent to which political imperatives could dilute SOEs‟ pursuit of financial performance 
objectives, it is debatable how the instrument used in this manner could lead directly to 
improved SOE performance. Rather, it is more likely to be utilised indirectly as a means of 
affecting the voting public‟s perception of the performance of the shareholding Minister‟s 
discharge of his duties rather than the commercial performance of the firm and the incentives 
facing its managers. This is discussed further in Section 5.  
 
4.2 Preventing insider trading 
Insider trading is when a person (an insider) – who has material information about a publicly 
listed company that is not available to the public – trades in a company‟s shares on the basis 
of this non-public information. Inside information allows an insider to make a more accurate 
                                                     
8 http://www.comu.govt.nz/about-comu/our-role/  
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valuation of the company‟s share value. Because this information is non-public, it is not 
reflected in the company‟s share price. Thus the insider will be able to make an easy profit 
from this information by buying shares when they are undervalued and selling when they are 
overvalued. This is supported empirically by Etebari, Tourani-Rad and Gilbert (2004).  
 
Insiders appropriate some of the return from investment from other shareholders, lowering the 
value of those shares to outside shareholders (Manove, 1989). Imagine an investor is 
considering buying shares in two companies, A and B. Company A has somehow made 
insider trading in its shares impossible, but insider trading in company B is still possible. In 
all other respects, the two companies are identical. Investors know that if they invest in 
company B, they may at some point unwittingly trade with an insider. Because the insider has 
a more accurate valuation of the company‟s shares, she will be able to buy when the stock is 
undervalued or sell when it is overvalued and make a profit. The counterparty in the trade, the 
outsider, will be worse off because the trade is zero sum. A potential investor, knowing that in 
the future he may unwittingly trade with an insider and be made worse off, will lower his 
valuation of the company‟s shares. Thus, investors will value company A shares higher than 
company B shares. This too is supported empirically. Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) draw 
on data from 103 countries around the world to show that enforcement of insider trading laws 
lowers the cost of equity for firms (i.e. increases their share price). Ojah, Muhanji and 
Myburg (2008) provide empirical evidence from South Africa showing that effective 
prohibition of insider trading led to a decrease in the cost of equity. 
 
Thus insider trading leaves the company worse off because its market value is lower and it is 
harder to acquire capital to fund investment. Investors are made worse off because part of 
their return on investment is appropriated by insiders, and society is worse off because there is 
lower investment (Ausubel, 1990) and equity is not allocated to the most productive 
investments. 
 
An insider, upon receiving insider information, will want to delay its release to investors so 
that they have time to trade on the share market before this information is incorporated into 
the share price. Continuous disclosure requires insiders to immediately disclose material 
information to the public, leaving them with no opportunity to trade on the share market. Thus 
a properly functioning continuous disclosure regime will help prevent insider trading. 
(Dennis, 1987) 
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As SOEs have no tradeable shares, and therefore no possibility exists of insider trading 
occurring, there is no societal benefit available from this aspect of continuous disclosure by 
SOEs.  
 
4.3 Reducing information acquisition costs 
The third rationale for continuous disclosure is the reduction of information acquisition costs. 
Information costs are costs associated with searching for and verifying information about, in 
this case, a firm. As discussed above, those managing firms have an incentive to withhold 
material information from investors for a variety of reasons. However, this information is still 
valuable to investors, so they will be willing to incur some information costs to find this 
information and use it to make better informed investment decisions.  
 
Furthermore, once an investor, or analyst employed by that investor, obtains material 
information, it is often in their interest to prevent the further dissemination of this information 
to other investors. An investor who has access to material information about a company, 
which is unavailable to other traders, is at an advantage and is able to earn a profit by trading 
on the basis of their information. By passing this information on to other investors, the initial 
investor destroys the advantage the information gave him, and so the investor has an incentive 
to withhold this information, in much the same way an insider does. This leads to further 
costs. First of all, the initial investor could theoretically pass on the material information to 
other investors at a very low cost. This would lead to the other investors being better off from 
being able to make better informed investment decisions, and would lead to prices of 
securities being a better reflection of the underlying value of those securities, leading to a 
more efficient allocation of capital. Second, other investors who don‟t have access to this 
information may choose to incur information costs themselves to obtain this information. 
Thus investors as a group may incur the same information cost multiple times to obtain the 
same information, when it was possible for only one investor to incur these costs and 
distribute the information to the other investors at relatively low cost. 
 
Continuous disclosure can reduce the information costs incurred by investors by requiring the 
manager to directly disclose all material information. The manager gains access to material 
information in her everyday duties in the company. In other words, she gains access to 
material information at close to no cost.
9
 This information is then submitted to the stock 
                                                     
9 There may be costs associated with the internal information systems of a company, for example reports from departments about 
their operations. However, these costs would have been incurred even without continuous disclosure, as they are necessary for 
the company to function properly. Thus these internal information system costs cannot be considered as costs of continuous 
disclosure. 
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exchange which can then easily disseminate this information to investors through. Another 
way of looking at the issue is that the manager in choosing to withhold material information 
imposes an external cost on investors. One may expect this social cost to be dealt with or 
internalised by interactions between the manager and investor (Coase, 1960). This is 
effectively what the proponents of the theory of self-induced disclosure claim. As explained 
above, this does not occur because the interests of the manager and the investors cannot be 
perfectly aligned.  
 
Let us now turn our attention to SOEs. Investors in SOEs and publicly listed companies are 
very different. Investors (and potential investors) in a PLC can quickly and easily buy and sell 
shares in that company. In contrast, the only way in which citizens can affect their level of 
investment in SOEs is vote for a government with a policy of acquiring, divesting or 
reinvesting in SOEs. That means the value of material information about SOEs is very low for 
individual citizens. Therefore, we expect very few people are incurring information costs to 
search for information about SOEs. Indeed, most of the analytical activity surrounding New 
Zealand SOEs is undertaken by COMU, using both publicly-available information and that 
acquired under separate statutory powers and negotiated agreements. Furthermore, the 
information collected by COMU is likely very different in its nature given that in the absence 
of share trading, very different processes must be used to assess the SOE‟s financial 
performance (Jensen, 1993). Thus, the costs of COMU‟s information acquisition are unlikely 
to be very different either with or without a continuous disclosure regime in place. Indeed, the 
obligation likely increases COMU‟s direct costs, as it must provide the means via which the 
disclosed information is made publicly available (i.e. the website) and the monitoring and 
enforcement activities required to ensure SOEs comply with the new obligations.  
 
Consequently, if the total information costs incurred by parties other than COMU in 
monitoring SOEs are very small, then reduction in information costs from having a 
continuous disclosure regime must also be very small. Indeed, the effect might actually be a 
net decrease in efficiency if the obligation to disclose leads to increases costs for the SOEs, 
but external parties fail to utilise the information as a consequence of there being no material 
benefit available to them from doing so.  
5. Transparency and improved performance 
The rationale put forward by the New Zealand government for its SOE continuous disclosure 
regime is that it will support and increase the transparency of SOEs. The proposition is that 
increased transparency will make managers more accountable for SOE performance, and give 
them a greater incentive to improve that performance. This Section develops a simple 
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principal-agent model of a PLC, and then contrasts it with a model of an SOE to assess the 
likelihood of the policy objectives for increased transparency being realised. Finally, the 
implications of this model on the ability of citizens to monitor managers will be discussed, 
along with why incentives for monitoring are necessary for effective operation of a 
continuous disclosure regime are necessary, but not present in the New Zealand SOE model.  
 
Figure 1: PLC agency relationship 
 
investors
managers
penalties and 
rewards
managerial
 services
continuous 
disclosure
 
 
The relationship between investors and managers is a classic example of a principal agent 
relationship (Figure 1). In a publicly listed company, investors (the principals) hire 
management (the agents) to run the company on their behalf. Investors want the company to 
be run to maximise shareholder returns, whereas management may prefer to maximize their 
own returns, for example by spending less effort running the business or choosing low risk 
projects to increase their job security. Investors have incomplete information about the 
performance of the management. To counteract this, the principal will put in place measures 
to induce the agent to act in the principal‟s interests. Examples of such measures are 
performance-based pay and close monitoring of the agent‟s actions. However, because 
principals generally have incomplete information about the performance of agents (as they 
cannot perfectly and costlessly observe all activities), it is impossible to perfectly align the 
interests of the agent with the principal. In other words, it is still possible for agents to act 
against the interests of the principal. 
 
Continuous disclosure is a way of giving investors (the principals) more information that they 
can use to monitor and assess the performance of the managers. With this additional 
information, investors are better able to sanction managers who have been acting against the 
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interest of investors, and reward those who have served them well. Managers knowing that 
they are under greater scrutiny will be more likely to act more in interest of investors, because 
it is now in their own self-interest to do so.  
 
Figure 2: SOE agency relationship 
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In the case of an SOE, citizens do not interact directly with SOE managers in the capacity of 
owners
10
. Instead, they delegate this role to the shareholding ministers of the current 
government. Shareholding ministers have the power to appoint and remove directors, set 
dividend levels and negotiate an SOE‟s statement of corporate intent. This leaves the citizens 
with little to no power to directly influence an SOE or its management. The only way that 
citizens can influence an SOE is indirectly by voting for a different government. This means 
there is a dual agency relationship (Figure 2). There is one agency relationship between the 
citizens (principal) and shareholding ministers (agent), and another agency relationship 
between the shareholding ministers (principal) and the managers of SOEs (agent).  
 
There are inherent problems in structures with differing allocations of control and ownership 
rights. Such structures have the potential to create agency costs that are an order of magnitude 
higher than structures in which control and ownership are aligned (Bebchuk, Kraakman & 
Triantis, 2000). 
 
                                                     
10 Though they may interact with SOEs in other economic „roles‟, for example as an employee or as a customer. 
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The agency relationship between the shareholding ministers and the managers of an SOE is 
relatively strong. That is, ministers have the potential to directly align the interests of SOE 
managers with their own. Ownership is concentrated in the two ministers, avoiding the free-
rider problems of dispersed ownership. The shareholding ministers have the Crown 
Ownership Monitoring Unit (COMU) to analyse the performance of managers of their behalf 
and the ministers have the power to appoint and remove SOE directors. As COMU sits within 
a core ministry (The Treasury), Ministers can direct COMU to report on specific aspects of 
SOE performance that are of interest to them. Such monitoring activity will inevitably flow 
through to the incentives SOE managers face – for example, in prioritising the range of 
activities under their control and allocating resources to them. An example of this is the „no 
surprises‟ policy under which SOEs are expected to keep the relevant ministers apprised of 
any activities or outcomes that might have political consequences. This inevitably leads to 
constraints on SOE managers‟ activities that are not faced by PLC managers, and 
compromises the pursuit of financial performance as the SOE‟s primary objective.  
 
By contrast the agency relationship between citizens and shareholding ministers is very much 
weaker. Citizens have scant direct control of shareholding ministers‟ activities and lack strong 
incentives to analyse and monitor their performance. 
 
The ability of citizens to control shareholding ministers is weak because of imperfections in 
the voting mechanism. First, they cannot vote for individual policies; they can only choose 
from a limited number of „policy bundles‟ offered by political parties and candidates. Citizens 
are unable to vote for all their preferred policies, so they have to decide which are most 
important and which can be forgone. For example, if a citizen wanted to decrease the level of 
investment in SOEs, the only choice in the 2008 New Zealand election would have been to 
vote for the ACT Party (a right-wing political party). However, the ACT Party has other 
policies it would like to enact, for example removing the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS, a 
system designed to lower greenhouse gas emissions). If a voter wanted to decrease their 
investment in SOEs, but also wants a strong ETS, they would have to decide to sacrifice one 
policy to enact the other. Therefore, citizens‟ voting choices may be driven by higher profile 
or more personally relevant issues than SOE policy.  
 
Second, voting is a noisy information channel. Political parties have only a very approximate 
understanding of why individuals voted for them. As each party has a plethora of policy 
positions and each voter has a unique set of preferences over all of these policies, political 
parties are likely to misinterpret the mandate voters have given them, considerably weakening 
the control voters have over the shareholding ministers. Third, citizens do not directly vote for 
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shareholding ministers. The party leadership selects ministers, and they may give out 
ministerial positions based on loyalty or political influence rather than past performance or 
voter preference.  
 
For citizens to undertake any SOE monitoring activity, the benefits of doing so must exceed 
the costs they expend. Information availability as a consequence of a continuous disclosure 
obligation alone is not sufficient to prompt individual citizens to undertake more SOE 
monitoring activity than would have occurred in its absence. Collecting and analysing 
available information is costly, so there must be a direct benefit that can be accrued by the 
individual(s) undertaking the activity. Many factors militate against incentivising the average 
citizen to engage in this costly analysis. First, ownership stakes in SOEs are very widely 
dispersed with each citizen holding roughly one four-millionth of each SOE. Therefore, each 
individual has such a small stake in each SOE that the personal benefits from undertaking any 
meaningful monitoring or analysis (even if they could be internalised) would far outweigh the 
costs. Second, citizens cannot easily change their level of investment in SOEs because of the 
imperfections in the voting mechanism noted above. If an analysis of the value of SOEs 
cannot be used to affect one‟s level of investment in SOEs, then a citizen has little or no 
incentive to perform such an analysis.  
 
Therefore, it is highly unlikely that individuals will invest resources in monitoring SOEs in 
which they cannot control their investment. However, it is possible than an organisation could 
monitor SOEs on behalf of citizens. Such an organisation could aggregate the interests of a 
group of citizens, spread the cost of monitoring across this group, and thereby recouping the 
costs. Financial analysts and the media are two candidates. They have an incentive to monitor 
if they can sell their analysis directly or use it to sell other products, e.g. newspapers. 
However, it matters which citizens are prepared to pay for such activities to be undertaken. 
Given the limited ability for individuals to personally benefit from improved financial 
performance of SOEs, the citizens for whom the benefits of such analysis exceed the costs are 
most likely members of sectoral interest groups engaged in political processes, whose strong 
personal preferences regarding the way the SOE should be managed may not be governed by 
financial performance imperatives. As the benefits they gain from such activity accrue in the 
political arena, their monitoring is unlikely to have any material effect upon SOE manager 
performance against financial objectives. The absence of an effect is reinforced if it is 
assumed that the SOE structure effectively constrains the extent to which political imperatives 
can override SOE financial performance objectives.  
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It is noted that almost half of NZX-listed companies have no analyst coverage (Capital 
Market Development Taskforce, 2009). If there is such a limited demand for financial 
analysis of such a large number of firms where the shares are tradeable, it appears extremely 
unlikely that demand for analysis of SOE financial performance will be strong. Consequently, 
analysts will be highly unlikely to offer such services without the ability to trade SOE shares 
being present. 
 
Another candidate is opposition parties who may use the information obtained from 
continuous disclosure to hold the shareholding ministers to account. However the outcome of 
such monitoring is not necessarily consistent with improved SOE performance. For example, 
it may be in the political interest of parties who favour continued state ownership of SOEs to 
overlook poor SOE performance. Ironically, making information available that would 
otherwise not have been obtained by these political agents may actually lead to a reduction in 
the incentives for SOE managers to pursue financial opportunities in the same manner as 
would their otherwise-equivalent PLC counterparts. Opposition parties face strong incentives 
to embarrass rather than reward ministers - making ministers, and SOE managers as their 
agents, highly risk-averse. This risk aversion may lead to SOE managers rejecting profitable 
projects due to the presence of political risk rather than utilising the commercial criteria that 
would normally govern such decisions. It is noted that this effect applies regardless of how 
well – or otherwise – the SOE structure facilitates management of the extent to which 
political imperatives can compromise SOE financial performance objectives
11
.  
 
In summary, it appears that three conditions must be satisfied for independent financial 
monitoring of firms to be justified by any party. First information about the agent‟s 
performance is needed. Second the principal needs an incentive to engage in analysis of this 
information. Third, the principal needs a mechanism through which it can influence the agent. 
In the case of SOEs, we have found the latter two conditions are absent, thereby reducing the 
benefits able to accrue from continuous disclosure. As citizens are unable to meaningfully 
exert the ownership interests of shareholders, most control mechanisms have been deferred to 
                                                     
11 A notable example of this effect (albeit relating to a sharemarket-listed firm where the government is a majority owner and not 
an SOE) is when it was discovered that Air New Zealand had fulfilled a charter contract with the Australian government under 
which which two of its planes transported troops to Kuwait in preparation for their engagement in Iraq. Whilst Air New Zealand 
maintained that the charter was a purely commercial arrangement, and the government was informed of the agreement, the 
opposition endeavoured to make the matter an issue of political importance. It cannot be discounted that the political 
consequences arising from this of this contract combined with the „no surprises‟ obligations on SOEs, would lead to Air New 
Zealand (and all SOEs, having observed this matter) eschewing other profitable commercial activities that would have been 
undertaken without hesitation by a PLC unencumbered by the consequences of political risks.  
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10457904  
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shareholding ministers. The voting mechanism does not allow citizens strong control of the 
government when it comes to individual issues. Consequently, citizens have little incentive to 
undertake time consuming and costly analysis of the information released by continuous 
disclosure. It therefore appears that the effects of the SOE continuous disclosure regime are 
more likely to pertain to the operation of political processes, and that these are as likely to 
compromise the pursuit of improved SOE financial performance as to enhance it.  
6. Credibility, penalties and frequency of disclosure  
Regardless of whether there are economic justifications for the SOE continuous disclosure 
regime, it is apposite to assess whether the New Zealand regime has in fact increased the 
amount and quality of information available in the same manner as observed when PLCs 
became so obligated. That is, are SOEs complying with the obligations, and are the 
institutional arrangements effective in monitoring and enforcing compliance?  
 
Any continuous disclosure regime will be effective only if both the regime itself, and the 
information provided, are credible. If investors believe the regime is not being fully complied 
with, continuous disclosure will be unable to fulfil its purpose. Full compliance requires the 
effective deterrence of non-compliance. Effective deterrence requires identification, detection, 
and punishment.  
 
Identification in this context means that it must be possible to evaluate whether or not a 
particular piece of information is subject to the disclosure regime or not. The „material effect 
on the share price‟ criterion is helpful here, as share price responses to new information 
(however released) are readily observable. However, an SOE has no observable share price. 
Therefore, determining whether or not information is material even for a hypothetical share 
price could be very difficult. 
 
Detection means it must be possible to identify when a specific instance of non-disclosure has 
occurred. After all, if there is no possibility of non-disclosure being detected, then 
withholding will likely occur, even when a disclosure obligation exists. Those monitoring and 
enforcing disclosure agreements „can never know what they cannot discover‟. For a firm with 
tradeable shares, an act of insider trading actually aids enforcement of a disclosure regime, as 
a significant share price change otherwise unexplained by information released would 
indicate that investigation of non-disclosure is warranted. However, as there is no possibility 
of insider trading in an SOE, detection of non-disclosure in SOEs becomes more difficult. 
Consequently, the likelihood of non-disclosure increases. 
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Punishment refers to the consequences of non-compliance. To ensure compliance when the 
probability of detection is low, severe sanctions are required. By way of comparison, 
insurance contracts often include terms to address non-disclosure of information that may 
have a material effect on the risk associated with cover. Penalties are typically higher the 
lower the probability of detection. Thus non-disclosure of a criminal record may lead to a 
whole policy being declared void, rather than relying on a case-by-case examination of the 
relevance of the withheld information to specific claims. Stiff penalties imposed on those 
caught not disclosing become a strong deterrent for other potential non-disclosers.  
 
For publicly listed companies in New Zealand, the Securities Commission has primary 
responsibility for enforcing continuous disclosure. It can issue a disclosure order, which 
carries a maximum penalty of $30,000 if not obeyed, and the courts can issue a pecuniary 
punishment of up to $1,000,000 per defendant. In April 2010, the Commission filed its first 
case under continuous disclosure regulations against Nuplex Industries Limited and six of its 
past and present directors. The case is still with the courts, but the Securities Commission has 
sent a strong signal that noncompliance with continuous disclosure regulations is a serious 
crime and will be prosecuted. For example, legal firm Kensington Swan recommended 
directors “err on the side of disclosing information that may be „material information‟.”12  
 
With respect to the SOE continuous disclosure regime, as there are no penalties for non-
compliance and no obvious means of detecting non-disclosure ex post, given the discussion in 
the preceding sections, we hypothesise that SOEs will disclose information less frequently 
than PLCs.  
 
The continuous disclosure regime for SOEs has been in place for over 15 months at the time 
of writing. This gives us an opportunity to test this hypothesis, and perform an early 
evaluation of how well the regime is performing. First of all, examples of material 
information that arguably should have been published on the COMU website but were not, 
are easy to find. It is important to note that these examples are cases where the SOE released 
the information via other channels (i.e. it was not „not disclosed‟), but failed to submit the 
disclosure to COMU for publication. As such, they are very different from cases where 
material information is not disclosed at all. However, they still show the extent to which 
SOEs are prepared (or not) to comply with the mechanics of a disclosure regime that directly 
parallels that with which PLCs are expected to comply. 
                                                     
12 http://www.kensingtonswan.com/Newsletters/Mergers%20and%20Acquisitions/Continuous_disclosure_obligations.pdf 
Accessed 8 December 2010. 
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By way of illustration, four examples of material information reported in the media that were 
not submitted to COMU for publication during 2010 are presented. On 27 January Meridian 
received approval from the Environment Court to build a 52 turbine wind farm
13
. On 24 June 
Landcorp announced it put in a bid to buy 16 Crafar family farms
14
. Though the size of the 
bid was not announced, a rival bid by Hong Kong listed Natural Dairy (NZ) Holdings was 
thought to be around $210 million, which would indicate that Landcorp‟s bid would be 
considered a material transaction under the disclosure rule‟s definition15. On 18 August the 
Government announced it would provide an uncalled capital facility to NZ Post
16
. On 18 May 
the Government announced that it would invest a further $750 million in the New Zealand 
Rail Corporation (NZRC) over the next two years
17
. Furthermore no disclosure was made 
regarding NZRC‟s $4.6 billion 10-year turnaround plan18. In comparison, for the financial 
year ending June 2010, NZRC had an Operating Revenue of only $0.65 billion. That such a 
significant, and expensive, strategic change was not accompanied by announcement on 
COMU‟s website in our view reflects poorly on the regime.  
 
Secondly, we compared the frequency of disclosures made by SOEs by matching them with 
publicly-listed counterparts that resemble them as closely as we could determine.
19
 Nine 
companies listed on the NZX were chosen, a matching company from the same industry and 
of a similar size for each SOE.
20
 We then counted the number of disclosures made by each 
over the 15 months for which SOE data was available. Table 1 summarises the findings. 
Whilst the data sample is too small for econometric testing, the descriptive statistics show that 
on average the PLCs made nearly four times as many disclosures as the SOEs. 
 
                                                     
13 http://new.nbr.co.nz/article/meridian-given-approval-wind-farm-117624 Accessed 1 December 2010. 
14 http://www.nzx.com/news/3847155/Landcorp-to-make-bid-for-Crafar-farms Accessed 1 December 2010. 
15 The SOE disclosure rules state that a transaction is considered material if the consideration payable or receivable is greater than 
5% of the SOE‟s current commercial value. Landcorp‟s current commercial value is estimated at $1.27 billion, meaning any 
transaction greater than $63 million is material.  
16 http://beehive.govt.nz/release/government-support-nz-post-plans Accessed 8 December 2010. 
17 http://www.nbr.co.nz/article/250-million-kiwirail-pre-budget-announcement-123174 Accessed 8 December 2010. 
18 http://www.kiwirail.co.nz/uploads/KiwiRail%20Turnaround%20Plan%20(Brochure).pdf Accessed 10 December 2010. 
19 When counting the number of disclosures made by SOEs, periodic disclosures such as the announcement of annual reports 
have been excluded, since we are only considering continuous disclosures. For PLCs, only disclosures listed as price sensitive on 
NZX‟s company research database are included. The time period in which disclosures are counted is 1 January 2010 to 21 April 
2011 for both SOEs and PLCs. 
20 These companies are: Freightways, Horizon Energy, Contact Energy, Trustpower, PGG Wrightson, Vector, Air New Zealand, 
NZ Oil and Gas and TeamTalk. 
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Table 1: Frequency of disclosure 
Number of disclosures SOEs PLCs 
Average  4.33 15.11 
Highest  11 39 
Lowest  1 3 
 
A much more detailed and accurate analysis could be performed if the regime were in for a 
longer time period, and if there were a greater number of SOEs for comparison. Furthermore, 
we have not controlled for the quantity or quality of information contained in each disclosure. 
However, Table 1 reveals that SOEs are disclosing substantially less frequently than their 
publicly listed counterparts. Whilst it is possible that the group of SOEs happened to have 
four times less material information to disclose, it is an unconvincing explanation, given that 
the PLCs were competing in the same industry and were of similar size as the SOEs. Thus, we 
suggest that the data appears to support our hypothesis that, as a consequence of both weaker 
incentives and inadequate compliance mechanisms arising from the differences in ownership 
and governance arrangements, SOEs subjected to a continuous disclosure regime modelled on 
that applied to PLCs are disclosing less frequently, and likely less information, than their PLC 
counterparts.  
7. Conclusion 
The New Zealand SOE continuous disclosure obligation represents a continuation of the 
transferral of instruments shown to improve managerial accountability and hence financial 
performance from the private sector into the public sector. However, it is difficult to 
conclude, on the basis of our theoretical and empirical analysis, that the continuous disclosure 
regime applied to New Zealand SOEs will have a material effect upon the financial 
performance of SOEs, at least by the mechanisms proposed in the policy supporting its 
implementation. Whist transparency might appear a laudable objective to pursue in its own 
right, the mere availability of more information is insufficient to encourage the extent of 
monitoring and enforcement necessary to hold managers accountable for their performance. 
In the absence of ownership interests directly benefiting from the monitoring and enforcement 
effort exerted, and governance instruments via which information discovered in that 
endeavour can be utilised by its discoverers to alter the incentives facing SOE managers in a 
manner that compensates the discoverers for their efforts, it is unlikely that an obligation to 
disclose will have any material financial performance effect.  
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SOEs differ from their PLC counterparts in precisely the dimensions of owner identity and 
governance mechanisms that have been demonstrated to sit at the core of efficient and 
effective operation of private sector continuous disclosure regimes. For PLCs, continuous 
disclosure is just one part of an interlocking system of ownership and governance 
mechanisms that create sharp performance incentives for managers. Each mechanism 
performs best when in combination with others that are consistent with each other. If 
continuous disclosure is to have the same performance improvement effects on SOEs, then 
both their ownership and governance arrangements must be altered to more closely resemble 
those of PLCs.. Whilst it is beyond the scope of this paper to create or comment upon policies 
in this area, it is noted that the partial listing of SOEs as has been proposed in recent policy 
discussions would make it much more likely that the financial performance improvement 
objectives of a continuous disclosure regime would be achieved than from the imposition of 
the disclosure regime alone.  
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